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Abstract: Supervenience is a topic-neutral, broadly logical relation between classes of properties or 
facts. In a slogan, A supervenes on B if and only if there cannot be an A-difference without a B-
difference. The first part of this paper considers different ways in which that slogan has been 
cashed out. The second part discusses applications of concepts of supervenience, focussing on the 
question whether they may provide an explication of determination theses such as physicalism.  
 
 Supervenience is a topic-neutral, broadly logical relation between classes of properties or facts. 
While it has been invoked most prominently in the metaphysics of mind, it is helpful in articulating 
views, and constraints on views, about a wide variety of topics, such as the relationship between the 
dispositional and the categorical, the modal and the non-modal, the general and the particular, or 
the extrinsic and the intrinsic.  
Roughly, A supervenes on B if and only if there cannot be an A-difference without a B-
difference. Or slightly more precisely, if no two possibilities differ with respect to A while being 
alike with respect to B.1 
The paper is in two parts. First, I consider various ways in which the above slogan has been 
cashed out. I introduce the standard varieties (1.1) and their cousins with restricted quantifiers (1.2), 
and generalize their formulation to apply to relations as well (1.3). Secondly, I survey philosophical 
uses of the concept. A typical use is to explicate certain determination theses, such as physicalism 
(2.1). However, it is debatable whether such explications are successful. I consider objections to the 
effect that supervenience theses are not strong enough (2.2) or not weak enough (2.3) for that 
purpose. Finally, I mention some less controversial uses of the concept of supervenience in 
argumentation and classification (2.4).  
 
 
1 Different Versions of Supervenience  
 
Supervenience has been taken to relate classes of entities of different categories, typically facts and 
properties, but also particulars, states, predicates, and sentences. Like most of the literature, I take 
supervenience as a relation between classes of properties as my main focus.  
The slogan “no A-differences without B-differences” has been cashed out in different ways. 
This led David Lewis to complain, in a much-cited passage, about an “unlovely proliferation of 
non-equivalent definitions,” because of which a “useful notion threatens to fade away into 
confusion” [Lewis, 1986a, p.14]. Indeed, the variety may be bewildering to the uninitiated. The 
survey article Bennett and McLaughlin [2005] lists 15 different formulations, which represent only 
a selection of those to be found in the literature. None of these formulations are equivalent in 
general, although particular assumptions about the classes A and B may entail equivalences. I here 
focus on the main varieties.  
 
1.1   The Standard Triad  
Following Kim [1984], discussions of supervenience standardly start by distinguishing between 
three versions: weak, strong, and global supervenience. The definitions of weak and of strong 
supervenience deploy a notion of indiscernibility of individuals relative to a class of properties: x in 
world w is A-indiscernible from x' in w' if for every property F ∈ A, x has F in w if and only if x' 
has F in w'. (We may then also say that x has F and x' in w' are A-duplicates.)  
 
Weak Supervenience  A weakly supervenes on B ⇔ in all possible worlds w, all individuals x and y 
that are B-indiscernible in w are A-indiscernible in w.  
 
Strong Supervenience  A strongly supervenes on B ⇔ for all possible worlds w and w' and 
individuals x in w and x' in w', if x in w and x' in w' are B-indiscernible, then they are also A-
indiscernible.  
 
Let us stipulate that the property Tallness is had in w by any x that is a person and taller than the 
average in w. Tallness weakly, but not strongly supervenes on height. Any two worldmates of equal 
height will be either both above, both at, or both below the average, and thus also agree on 
Tallness.  Therefore, the condition for weak supervenience is met. However, the average 
presumably varies from world to world, and hence some individuals in different worlds differ in 
Tallness while having the same height. As a result, Tallness does not strongly supervene on height.  
Weak and strong supervenience are species of individual supervenience. Sometimes we are 
interested in whether whole worlds, rather than individuals within worlds, could differ in one 
respect without differing in another respect. For example, some physicalists allow that physically 
indiscernible individuals differ with respect to the content of their thoughts, but insist that 
individuals can only so differ if their environments are physically different. They thus accept a 
thesis of global supervenience, whose rough-and-ready formulation is as follows:  
 
Global Supervenience   A globally supervenes on B ⇔ if two possible worlds have the same 
distribution of B, they have the same distribution of A.   
 
It is not straightforward to make this notion precise. Suppose that in both world w and w', there are 
exactly two individuals: a red cube and a blue sphere in w, and a blue cube and a red sphere in w'. 
Are w and w' alike with respect to color-properties, and with respect to shape-properties? The 
answers seem to depend on how we compare w and w'. If we pair up the two cubes and the two 
spheres, respectively, for the purposes of comparison, we will conclude that w and w' are alike with 
respect to shapes, but different with respect to colors. If, on the other hand, we pair up the two blue 
things and the two red things, respectively, we will conclude that the worlds are alike with respect 
to colors, but different with respect to shapes. 
This talk of pairing up individuals is cashed out in terms of a function between the domains 
of different worlds [Paull and Sider, 1992]: an A-isomorphism from w to w' is a one-one function µ 
from the domain of w onto the domain of w' such that for all F ∈ A (R ∈ A), x has F in w if and only 
if µ(x) has F in w' (R holds of x1,...,xn in w if and only if R holds of µ(x1),...,µ(xn) in w'). If we take 
two possible worlds to have the same distribution of B if and only if there is a B-isomorphism 
between them, the rough-and-ready formulation above yields what is called “weak global 
supervenience”: 
 
Weak Global Supervenience   A weakly globally supervenes on B ⇔ for any possible worlds w to 
w', if there is a B-isomorphism between w and w', there is also an A-isomorphism between 
w and w'.   
 
Several authors have argued that weak global supervenience is too weak to capture what 
philosophers typically have in mind when they invoke global supervenience [e.g. Stalnaker 1996]. 
The possibility of a physical duplicate of our world in which mental properties are permuted among 
the individuals, relative to the actual world, is compatible with the weak global supervenience of 
the mental on the physical properties [Bennett 2004, Shagrir 2002]. Therefore, a stronger explanans 
has been proposed:  
 
Strong Global Supervenience   A strongly globally supervenes on B ⇔ for any possible worlds w to 
w', every B-isomorphism between w and w' is also an A-isomorphism.   
 
Arguably, strong global supervenience is too strong to capture the concept of global supervenience 
[Bennett 2004]. Further candidates are being proposed, and it remains an open question how global 
supervenience is best cashed out.2  
What logical relationships are there between the four notions defined here? It is easy to 
verify that strong supervenience entails both weak supervenience and strong global supervenience, 
and that strong global supervenience in turn entails weak global supervenience. For relata A and B 
that consist exclusively of monadic properties, strong global supervenience entails weak 
supervenience.3 In all of these cases, the converse entailment fails.4 Weak supervenience and weak 
global supervenience are logically independent from each other.5  
  
1.2   Restricted Versions  
Weak, strong, and global supervenience involve quantifications over possible individuals or 
possible worlds.  When considering broadly modal claims, we are not always quantifying over all 
possible worlds.  The concepts of necessity and possibility come in families, whose members 
correspond to different delineations of the class of worlds quantified over. Examples include 
nomological, technological, practical, and historical necessity and possibility. Just as we sometimes 
consider such restricted modalities, we may sometimes wish to consider restricted varieties of 
supervenience.  Those are typically contingent. 
In schematic formulations of supervenience claims, it is thus useful to relativize both sides 
of the biconditional to a possible world. The amended formulation of, for example, strong 
supervenience reads as follows: A strongly supervenes on B in world w* if for all worlds w and w' 
that are possible relative to w*, and all individuals x in w and x' in w', if x in w and x' in w' are B-
indiscernible, then they are A-indiscernible.  
Sometimes, we may wish to speak of nomological supervenience (strong or global), 
quantifying only over worlds in which the actual laws of nature are true. For example, Chalmers 
[1996] accepts the nomological while denyning the metaphysical supervenience of the phenomenal 
on the physical.  Lewis formulated two particularly influential restricted supervenience thesis, 
which he called “minimal materialism” [Lewis, 1983] and “Humean supervenience” [Lewis, 
1986b]. They exclude worlds with so-called “aliens,” fundamental properties or relations that are 
not actually instantiated (ectoplasmic properties, perhaps), from the domain of quantification. 
Minimal materialism is then true at world w if everything globally supervenes, among worlds in 
which there are no aliens relative to w, on the physical properties and relations.  Humean 
supervenience is true at world w if everything globally supervenes, among worlds in which there 
are no aliens relative to w, on spatiotemporal relations and intrinsic, categorical properties of point-
sized things.  
 
1.3   Generalization to Relations  
As characterized, weak, strong, and global supervenience are three families of relations between a 
world and two classes of properties. However, not every supervenience claim that we may wish to 
make fits one of the templates provided so far. The above formulations of individual supervenience 
in a crucial respect lack generality: they are only defined for classes A and B of monadic properties. 
Just as logic neglected predicates of more than one argument place for much of its history, so the 
literature on supervenience has largely neglected polyadic relations.6  
An example: Let Richness include the property of owning the equivalent of x million 
dollars, for every dollar amount x. Then the relation of having a larger fortune, Richer, supervenes 
on Richness. The template for global supervenience claims provided allows us to say that Richer 
globally supervenes on Richness. But this does not capture what we want to assert. The 
supervenience relation that holds between Richer and Richness is not merely global. Intuitively, 
this is because we do not need to look at the distribution of Richness in the whole world to 
determine whether one individual is richer than another. In this respect, Richer is different from the 
relation that holds between two things if and only if there is just one person intermediate in 
richness. 
There are more interesting examples of supervenience claims about relations.  A relation is 
standardly classified as internal if it supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its relata. (Examples 
presumably include being taller than, and having the same mass.) We do not have any problems in 
understanding such a non-global supervenience conditions involving relations, even though the 
above templates of weak and strong supervenience are of no help.  The fact that we can extrapolate 
it beyond the usual realm of application, without having to take recourse to stipulative definition, 
suggests that individual supervenience is a concept in good standing.  
The notion of an isomorphism preserving instantiation structure, which we encountered in 
the brief discussion of global supervenience above, is also suited to analyze how individual 
supervenience applies to relations of any adicity.  Let a partial A-isomorphism from w to w' be any 
one-one mapping µ from a subclass D1 of the domain of w to a subclass D2 of the domain of w' 
such that for all R ∈ A and all x1,...,xn in D1, R holds of x1,...,xn in w if and only if R holds of 
µ(x1),...,µ(xn) in w'. The concept of a partial A-isomorphism is more general than that of an A-
isomorphism used to characterize global supervenience. We obtain the latter as a special case: an A-
isomorphism is a partial A-isomorphism that relates improper subclasses of the respective domains, 
that is, the domains themselves.  
We can now formulate a more general schema for individual supervenience. I focus on 
strong supervenience:  
 
Strong Supervenience (generalized) A strongly supervenes on B if for all possible worlds w and w', 
every partial B-isomorphism from w and w' is a partial A-isomorphism.7   
 
This generalized formulation has the welcome feature of coinciding with the original one in the 
case where both A and B exclusively consist of monadic properties. Too see this, suppose first that 
A strongly supervenes on B according to the original definition, and that µ is a partial B-
isomorphism from w to w'. Then for every x in the domain of µ, x and µ(x) are B-indiscernible, and 
by the assumption of strong supervenience, they are also A-indiscernible.  Hence µ is a partial A-
isomorphism from w to w' as well, and strong supervenience according to the generalized definition 
holds. For the other direction of the equivalence, suppose now that A does not strongly supervene 
on B according to the original definition.  Then there are B-duplicates x in w and x' in w' that differ 
in some A-property.  Hence a function from {x} to {x'} is a partial B-isomorphism from w to w  but 
not a partial A-isomorphism, and hence strong supervenience according to the generalized 
definition fails too.  
It is a further welcome feature of this generalized formulation of strong supervenience that 
it immediately implies strong global supervenience. Suppose every partial A-isomorphism between 
w and w' is a partial B-isomorphism. Then since isomorphisms are a special case of partial 
isomorphisms, every B-isomorphism between these worlds is an A-isomorphism, and A strongly 
globally supervenes on B.  
How does the characterizations of internal relations fit the regimented form for 
supervenience claims involving relations? Instead of saying that internal relations supervene on the 
intrinsic properties of their relata, we can, using the regimented vocabulary, say that they strongly 
supervene on intrinsic properties. The relata need not be mentioned any more.  
                                              
 
2   Applications  
A list of ways in which a topic-neutral, broadly logical concept can be deployed is presumably 
open-ended.  Here I select a few examples from three types of uses:  in explication, in 
argumentation, and in classification.  
 
2.1   Uses in Explication  
Supervenience is often regarded as a regimented cousin, or an explication, of an informally grasped 
concept. Regardless of the truth or falsity of particular supervenience claims, it is a disputed 
question whether supervenience succeeds as an explication. To discuss this question, we need to 
know more about what I call the target thesis, the claim that A supervenes on B is meant to 
explicate.  So far, I pretended that the target thesis is that A-facts are determined by B-facts.  
However, there is not one pre-theoretical locution that fully expresses the target claim, and hence 
this is merely a first approximation. More needs to be said.8  
A paradigmatic target thesis is physicalism about the mind, putatively explicated by the 
claim that mental properties and relations supervene on physical ones. Further partial elucidation of 
the target thesis is provided by each of the locutions that A entirely depends on B, and that A is 
nothing over and above B. We can also say that the target thesis is a reductionism in spirit but not 
in letter.9  
A supervenience thesis is, in broad sense, reductionist. But it is a stripped-down form of 
reductionism, unencumbered by dubious denials of existence, claims of ontological priority, or 
claims of translatability. One might wish to say that in some sense the beauty of statues is nothing 
over and above the shape and size and colour that beholders appreciate, but without denying that 
there is such a thing as beauty, without claiming that beauty exists only in less-than-fundamental 
way, and without undertaking to paraphrase ascriptions of beauty in terms of shape etc. A 
supervenience thesis seems to capture what the cautious reductionist wishes to say.  [Lewis, 1998, p. 
29]  
 
2.2   Is Supervenience Too Weak?  
Is the thesis that A supervenes on B apt to explicate the target thesis, as just characterized? One way 
in which it may fail is by lacking certain implications of the target thesis—roughly, supervenience 
may fail to be a sufficient condition for determination.10 I discuss three types of objections to that 
effect: that supervenience, but not the target thesis, is compatible with certain substantive 
necessities, and that it is compatible with disproportional variation, and that the supervenience 
relation has the wrong logical features.  
First, the objection from strong necessities. This objection can be presented most strikingly 
for global supervenience with sets of facts rather than properties as relata. That relation is defined 
as follows: A-facts globally supervene on B-facts if and only if there are no two possible worlds 
where the same B-facts but different A-facts hold. It then follows that any necessary facts globally 
supervene on any facts: the continuum hypothesis globally supervenes on facts about what I had for 
breakfast today. However, it sounds odd to say the former facts are determined by, or are nothing 
over and above, the latter.  
In response, one can argue that oddity is not falsity. Perhaps it is true that the facts about my 
breakfast determine the continuum hypothesis, but odd to assert it, for pragmatic, broadly Gricean 
reasons. Presumably, a debate about that response would to some extent be parallel to the debate 
about whether all conditionals with necessary consequents are true, and whether necessary 
propositions are entailed by anything. This debate is beyond the scope of this paper. But the 
response just mentioned would in any case be unpromising if there are “brute” or “strong” 
necessities, that is, necessities whose denial is perfectly coherent and conceivable. 
To illustrate this, consider physicalism, the target thesis for the claim that all properties and 
relations supervene on physical properties and relations. Traditionally, physicalism is taken to be 
incompatible with theism.  It is likewise incompatible with an emergentist view of some early 20th 
century British philosophers, according to which non-physical configurational forces emerge if 
physical aggregates reach a certain complexity.  Yet global supervenience claims for facts that are 
supposed to capture physicalism are compatible with the necessity of both theism and emergentism 
[Wilson, 2005], and a fortiori with their truth.  
A defender of the adequacy of the explications in terms of supervenience may argue that 
there are no necessities of the troublesome sort: it is possible that there is no God, and it is possible 
that there are no emergent configurational forces. Perhaps this is inferred from certain 
combinatorial principles, or from our conceiving that there is no God, and that there are no 
configurational forces. If these modal facts can be established, the objection can be answered. 
When assessing what implications supervenience theses have, we should be able to use background 
knowledge about possibilities and necessities as well.  If we are, we can conclude that 
supervenience theses are incompatible with theism and emergentism after all.  For given plausible 
assumptions, contingent theist and emergentist claims are incompatible with supervenience on the 
physical; and being necessarily false, non-contingent theist and emergentist claims are trivially 
incompatible with any claim, in particular a supervenience thesis.  
Of course, this is not the end of the debate. A story about how we can know the pertinent 
possibility claims is needed.  After all, it is not obvious that combinatorial principles are true, and 
that what we can conceive is indeed possible. Why should there not be brute necessities? Whether 
such a story can be given is a question well beyond the scope of this survey article. Still, we can 
draw the following lesson from the problem of strong necessities: the question whether 
supervenience claims explicate their targets and whether we can have knowledge of possibility and 
necessity are closely related.    
Second, the objection from disproportional variation.  Supervenience is the claim that there 
are no diferences of one sort without differences of another sort. However, some philosophers take 
the target thesis also to imply that there are no large differences of one sort without large 
differences of another sort.  Variation in A must be proportional with variation in B. For example, 
Kim urges that physicalism is incompatible with there being a world w that differs from ours only 
in Saturn's ring having one more ammonia molecule, but in which plants, but no creatures with 
brains are conscious [Kim, 1987]. Clearly, though, that possibility is compatible with the global 
supervenience of mental on physical properties: the actual world and w are physically discernible, 
after all.  Individual supervenience is likewise vulnerable to examples of that sort, for it is 
compatible with you having a zombie twin that is physically like you apart from the presence of an 
extra neutrino.  
A concessive response is to amend supervenience claims in order to rule out disproportional 
variation by fiat. Kim [1987] suggests that physicalists help themselves to a relation he calls 
"similarity-based supervenience" of A on B, which may be defined as follows: for every degree of 
similarity c, if two possibilities are B-similar to at least degree c, they are A-similar to at least 
degree c.11 Since indiscernibility is similarity to the maximal degree, this defined relation implies 
supervenience ordinarily construed.  
It is unclear whether it could be satisfactorily spelt out what when two things are A-similar 
to the same degree as they are B-similar.  But in any case, the concession that disproportionalities 
need to be ruled out might have been premature. McLaughlin [1995, p. 35] and Post [1995, p. 86] 
have argued that there may be cases where a small B-difference makes for a large A-difference, 
compatibly with A-facts being determined by B-facts.  
It is not clear whether their point fully answers the objection, though.  Perhaps the target 
thesis is compatible with some disproportionalities and incompatible with others. The 
supervenience claim is still a bad explication if it is compatible with all of them. But perhaps the 
assumption that there are no strong necessities comes to the rescue again. Unexplainable 
disproportionalities are a species of strong necessities. In the example above, it is supposed to be 
necessary that if there is an extra ammonia molecule in Saturn’s ring, but otherwise things are as 
they actually are physically, then plants are conscious and brains are not. There is no explanation 
for why brains could not be conscious, or why plants could not be unconscious, given the 
antecedent. To be sure, there are some disanalogies to the supposed strong necessities considered 
before, the existence of God and the laws about configurational forces.  Nonetheless, the strategy 
may provide an answer to the objection from disproportionalities that do not saddle the defender of 
the explication with additional commitments.  
Third, the objections  from irreflexivity and asymmetry. Supervenience is reflexive, and 
neither symmetric nor asymmetric. In contrast, the target relation of determination or reducibility is 
apparently irreflexive and asymmetric [e.g. Kim 1984]. The objections from irreflexivity and 
asymmetry are related, for asymmetry implies irreflexivity.  
There is room to dispute that the target relation is asymmetric. While it is not typically the 
case that both A determines B and B determines A, we should not be too quick to conclude that such 
a case is logically impossible. Perhaps there is a version of the Leibnizian doctrine of pre-
established harmony according to which the mental properties determine the physical ones, and 
also vice versa.  
Pragmatic mechanisms may be used to explain why it would often be odd to assert that A 
determines A. Moreover, we may note that it sounds true, if uninteresting, to say that A is nothing 
over above A. The plausibility of the objection from irreflexivity is thus sensitive to what pre-
theoretical locution we are using to approximate the target thesis.    
Of course, there are other objections against the adequacy of supervenience as an 
explication besides those from strong necessities, disproportional variation, irreflexivity and 
asymmetry. Some of them apply only to particular formulations of supervenience. Others dismiss 
wholesale the idea that the target thesis could be captured with a broadly modal concept such as 
supervenience: the target thesis may require a connection between the domains of A-facts and B-
facts that is not implied by any claim about covariation patterns in modal space. For some 
objectors, what is missing is a metaphysical connection, perhaps by a relation expressed by the 
locution “in virtue of.”12 For other objectors, what is missing is some explanatory connection, to be 
articulated in epistemic rather than modal terms. Both these sorts of objections are beyond the 
scope of this essay.13  
  
2.3   Is Supervenience Too Strong?  
Supervenience claims have also been accused of having surplus implications, which are not shared 
by the target claims. I briefly discuss the objection that supervenience theses imply the letter and 
not just the spirit of reductionism, and that being necessary, they have a diferent modal status than 
the contingent target thesis. Whether one is moved by these objections will be sensitive to how 
exactly one construes the target thesis.  
The objection from irreducibility insists that a supervenience claim implies more than just 
the cautious, bridled version of reductionism as which it is often advertised. If A supervenes on B, 
then given sufficiently rich logical resources (infinite Boolean operators, quantifiers, identity), any 
member of A can be defined in terms of the members of B (Kim [1984]; Glanzberg [2001]). Under 
the further assumption that B is closed under definability by these logical resources, it follows that 
any F∈ A is itself already a member of B.  For example, given strong enough closure condition on 
the class of physical properties, the claim that mental properties supervene on physical properties 
implies the identity theory, according to which every mental property just is a physical property. 
One response is to deny a commitment to the pertinent closure principles about B. Another 
response is to accept them, but deny that the resulting reductionism is of an implausible kind. In the 
example of the mind-body identity theory, what seems incredible is that there is a reasonably short 
way of expressing mental properties in terms of the simple predicates of the language of physics. 
Whether they can be expressed given infinite resources is not something about which our 
plausibility judgements should be trusted. A third response starts from the observation that if the 
supervenience thesis does not quantify over all metaphysically possible worlds, it does not imply 
that every property in A is definable in terms of properties in B. There are independent reasons for 
trying to explicate the target thesis with a contingent supervenience claim, as suggested by the next 
objection.  
The objection from contingency is that supervenience claims are non-contingent, while the 
target thesis is contingent. Take again physicalism as an example. Plausibly, there could be 
ectoplasmic and other non-physical fundamental properties, even though they are not actual 
according to the physicalist. Then two individuals or worlds may differ with respect to such an 
alien property F, but display the same distribution of physical properties of relations. It follows that 
F does not supervene on the physical properties, and hence that the claim that all properties 
supervene on the physical properties is false.  Still, physicalism may intuitively be true in the actual 
world (Lewis [1998], Jackson [1994], Chalmers [1996]). The standard move in response is to have 
the target thesis explicated by a contingent supervenience that does not quantify over worlds with 
alien fundamental properties, such as Lewis's minimal materialism introduced in 1.2.  
 
2.4   Uses in Argumentation and Classification  
Supervenience may be a useful concept even if it does not provide explications of a target thesis. It 
has also argumentative uses. Suppose p is a claim under dispute. If one can establish that p implies 
the supervenience of A on B, and that A does not supervene on B, one can infer that p is false.  In 
McLaughlin’s phrase, p then falls to a FIST, or "Failure of Implied Supervenience Thesis" 
[McLaughlin, 1984].  The "Conceivability Argument" or "Zombie Argument" against physicalism, 
championed by Chalmers [1996], implements this strategy.  From the premises that physicalism 
implies the supervenience of phenomenal consciousness on physical properties, and that the 
conceivability of zombies is incompatible with the holding of that supervenience relation, it 
concludes that physicalism is false.   
There are also argumentative uses that do not require that supervenience is a necessary 
condition for a claim under discussion. Rather, they require that supervenience is incompatible with 
such a claim p. While in the FIST strategy, a supervenience claim is denied, it is here asserted in 
the course of disputing p.  If one can establish that p is incompatible with the supervenience of A on 
B, and that A does supervene on B, one can infer that p is false. That strategy, which is still in need 
of a punchy label, is strategy is often heralded by the slogan that “truth supervenes on being” 
[Bigelow, 1988] and directed at views according to which dispositions and counterfactual 
conditionals do not supervene on categorical properties and relations, such as certain versions of 
phenomenalism and behaviorism [Lewis, 2001, p. 609].  
The strategy is also implemented by the so-called “Supervenience Argument” against 
coincidentalism [e.g. Zimmerman 1995]. According to coincidentalism, spatiotemporally 
coincident entities may differ in their modal properties. The major premise of the supervenience 
argument is that if there are coincident entities, they would differ modally without differing non-
modally.  The minor premise is that modal properties strongly supervene on non-modal properties. 
Together, they entail that there are no coincident entities.   
In some debates, it is useful to separate two parties according to whether they accept a 
certain supervenience thesis. Internalism about mental content concerns intentional properties, such 
as believing p, for some proposition p. We might try to characterize this kind of internalism as the 
thesis that intentional properties are intrinsic to thinkers. However, there is no consensus about 
what intrinsic properties are, and even about whether there actually are any intrinsic properties. The 
debate about internalism can abstract from these difficulties, and one way to do this is to take 
internalism as the claim that intentional properties strongly supervene on some specified class of 
properties, say neurophysiological ones. The argumentative and the classificatory uses are related: a 
position characterized by accepting a supervenience claim becomes vulnerable to a FIST. A 
pertinent example is provided by Putnam’s and Burge’s thought experiments against meaning 
internalism and content internalism.  
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1 Some authors prefer to state the schema with the roles of the letters ‘A’ and ‘B’ reversed. To 
remember the convention followed here, it helps to associate ‘B’ with 'basic' or 'base'.  
 
2 Recent contributions to the debate about how to formulate global supervenience include Bennett 
[2004] and Shagrir [2002]; Bennett and McLaughlin [2005] give an overview.  
 
3 Suppose that A does not weakly supervene on B. Then there is a world w in which two individuals 
x and y are B-indiscernible but not A-indiscernible. Then if  µ(x) = y, µ(y) = x, and µ(z) = z for all 
z distinct from x and y, µ is a B-isomorphism from from w to itself. Since x and µ(x) are not A-
indiscernible, it is not an A-isomorphism, and A does not strongly globally supervene on B. (This 
argument does not go through if there are non-monadic relations in A or B, and indeed, the 
entailment does not generally hold in that case. Since I discuss non-global supervenience for 
relations only briefly in section 1.3, I cannot elaborate on this issue here. 
4 The main text sketches examples that show that weak does not imply strong 
supervenience, and that weak global does not imply strong global supervenience.  
An example that shows that strong global supervenience does not entail strong 
supervenience: there are only two possible worlds with different domain sizes, all individuals in 
both worlds are B-indiscernible, and the individuals in a world are A-indiscernible from each other, 
but B-discernible from those in the other world. Then A strongly globally, but not strongly 
supervenes on B. 
From the fact that weak supervenience does not imply weak global supervenience (note 5), 
and the fact that weak global supervenience is implied by strong global supervenience, it follows 
that weak supervenience does not imply strong global supervenience either.    
5 For a given world w, the property of belonging to w weakly, but not weakly globally supervenes 
on the property of self-identity. Thus weak supervenience does not imply weak global global 
supervenience. If there is just one possible world w, and if two individuals are B-indiscernible but 
not A-indiscernible, then A weakly globally, but not weakly supervenes on B.     
 
6 An exception is Kim [1993a], who concludes that "many interesting issues arise when relations 
are explicitly brought into supervenience, and they are deserving of further study" (p. 165).  
 
7 If we want to discuss the supervenience claims involving cross-world relations, we need to allow 
the domain and the range of the partial A-isomorphism to draw individuals from different worlds.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
8 No doubt, different philosophers who use supervenience for purposes of explication do not 
construe the target thesis in exactly the same way. I have to abstract from this complicating factor 
in my discussion.  
 
9 This is controversial since supervenience has often been invoked by self-described "non-
reductive physicalists." Davidson was particularly influential for this conception. The question how 
non-reductive physicalism ought to be understood is beyond the scope of this article.  
 
10 The titles of this and of the next section buy brevity at the price of imprecision. For all we know, 
supervenience claims may lack certain implications of the target thesis and yet have implications 
that the target claim does not. In that case, it would be neither weaker nor stronger than the target 
claim, but still inadequate.  
 
11 The formulation differs from Kim's, but I think it captures the spirit of his proposal. How this 
proposal is made precise depends on whether possibilities are individuals or worlds, and whether 
the relata are sets of facts or properties.  
12 Such objections would need to be discussed in the larger context of a debate between 
intensionalist and hyperintensionalist approaches to metaphysics.  For a classic anti-intensionalist 
paper, see Fine [1994]. For an anti-intensionalist line particularly with respect to determination 
relations, see Keller [2007]. 
13 I also cannot discuss the thesis that physicalists are committed to superdupervenience rather than 
just supervenience,  where superdupervenience is "ontological supervenience that is robustly 
explainable in a materialistically acceptable way" [Horgan, 1993, p.566] Superdupervenience may 
be proposed as an explication of the target thesis in my sense, or as a doxastic or pragmatic 
constraint: that one ought not to believe, or assert, a supervenience claim unless one can also 
believe, or assert, the superdupervenience claim.  
 
